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Roula Khalaf, editor-in-chief of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.

The prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House and his nomination of J.D. Vance, a hardline isolationist, as his running mate have raised the difficult question of what price is worth paying to bring peace to Ukraine. Trump has ridiculously boasted that he could end Vladimir Putin’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine overnight, without explaining how. Former Trump advisers have sketched out feeble plans for a ceasefire in exchange for territorial concessions. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Europe’s leading advocate, has gone on a self-described “peace mission” to Kiev, the Kremlin and Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s Florida stronghold.

Ukraine, too, has stepped up its efforts to set the terms for a just peace. Given its current military support from its allies—and its refusal to use long-range weapons to degrade Putin’s war machine inside Russia itself—Kiev has no realistic military path to freeing all its lands. Fatigue is growing. Millions of Ukrainians face a cold, dark winter after Russian missiles pulverized half the country’s energy supply. Recent polls suggest that a large minority of Ukrainians now support peace negotiations, with more and more even willing to consider territorial concessions to buy peace.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has proposed holding another multilateral peace conference before the US elections, to which Russia would be invited. His foreign minister has just visited China, Russia’s main diplomatic and material supporter. Ultimately, Kiev will have to decide when to negotiate an end to the war. At this point, however, the chances of a successful peace process seem slim. Ukraine wants to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty; Moscow wants Ukraine to submit and gain full control over four of its provinces. These positions are irreconcilable, and neither side has the military leverage to force the other to yield.

If Ukraine were to be forced into an unfavorable settlement by threatening to withdraw further military aid, as some Trump supporters propose, it would be a disaster not only for the country, but also for European security and for the West.

To be sure, victory for Ukraine cannot be defined only by the full and immediate restoration of the 1991 borders. Becoming a prosperous democracy embedded in the EU and free from Moscow’s tutelage, even with its territory partially occupied, would be a huge success. Ukrainian negotiators seemed ready to agree to such a deal in the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion.

But after 29 months of aggression, many Ukrainians understandably see trading land for peace as a false prospect. Putin’s goals are not territorial, but imperial. He wants to end Ukraine as an independent nation. It would be the height of naivety to think that the Russian leader will negotiate in good faith or honor his promises. Rewarding his aggression will embolden further aggression—and embolden Russia’s allies in Beijing.

For Kiev to accept a deal—and for it to succeed—its allies would have to offer meaningful security guarantees that would dwarf the support they have provided so far. Are they willing to do that? Given the hesitation in Washington and other capitals about arming Ukraine over the past two and a half years, promises of further arms will not suffice.

Ukraine will be in a better position next year to go on the offensive and improve its negotiating position. Indeed, Kiev’s friends must maintain their determination to turn the war more in Ukraine’s favor. This is especially true for the Europeans who risk becoming bystanders to an unjust settlement that seriously endangers their own security. They must increase their support and add their weight to Ukraine’s efforts to seek a just peace. Putin will agree to peace only if he has no alternative.