As NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary at the summit in Washington DC, the organization found itself at a critical juncture: expanding cooperation with the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries, including South Korea. NATO’s strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific has become crucial not only for maintaining global stability but also for addressing the interconnected challenges posed by actors such as Russia and North Korea on the one hand, and China on the other.

In the words of NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, alliance was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans under control.” Today, especially if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, the mission has evolved: keep the Americans engaged (still), contain Russia’s aggressive actions in Europe, and prevent China from expanding its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In other words, NATO has learned lessons from the Euro-Atlantic area to prepare for contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region.

In fact, the Washington Summit Declaration states in Article 30 that “The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, as developments in the region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” The declarations emphasized the need to discuss “common security challenges and areas of cooperation” with the EU. To this end, fostering like-minded alliances with partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially South Korea, is key.

NATO’s Strategic Pivot to the Indo-Pacific

The 75th anniversary summit in Washington DC was a pivotal moment for NATO to reinforce its commitments and strategies in the Indo-Pacific region. Following this, US President Joe Biden emphasized the role of the Indo-Pacific region for NATO several times in his post-summit press conference, and the Korean Peninsula no less than nine times.

Likewise, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, attending his third consecutive NATO summit, stressed the importance of this engagement. This continuity at high-level meetings reflects a growing recognition within NATO of the need to deepen partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, an area increasingly seen as central to global security.

European experts often claim that the future of the world will be shaped by events in Europe, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine, or the Middle East, where conflicts such as Gaza still simmer. However, the real battleground for global influence and stability may lie in the Indo-Pacific. The dynamics in the region, particularly with regard to China and the Korean Peninsula, have direct and significant implications for both regional and global security.

Concrete results are essential for these summits to translate into actionable policies and joint initiatives. As noted in the Washington Declaration, cybersecurity and hybrid threats are two areas where NATO and South Korea can make significant progress. For example, establishing joint cyber operations and intelligence-sharing mechanisms would be a significant step forward. The importance of cyber cooperation, including the possibility of joint exercises and coordinated responses to cyber threats and disinformation campaigns, could bring NATO and South Korea even closer together.

Another practical area of ​​cooperation lies in hybrid warfare strategies. There is ongoing work within NATO to counter hybrid threats from China. By drawing on South Korea’s experience with North Korean cyber activities, NATO could improve its own capabilities and resilience against such threats. This includes integrating South Korean experts into NATO’s Centers of Excellence in Tallinn and Helsinki, which focus on hybrid threats and cybersecurity.

NATO’s institutional and cultural challenges

The path to deeper cooperation is not without its challenges, however. There are institutional and cultural hesitations within NATO regarding a more pronounced role in the Indo-Pacific. Several European countries often display caution, fearing that expanding NATO’s mandate too far beyond its traditional Euro-Atlantic focus could overextend the alliance and complicate its core mission. These internal dynamics must be carefully navigated to build consensus and maintain momentum for cooperation.

Furthermore, the geopolitical landscape adds another layer of complexity. The different relationships between China and various NATO members, often driven by economic interests, create a divergence in threat perception and strategic priorities. While economic considerations influence national policies, there is unanimous recognition within classified NATO institutions of the strategic challenges that China poses.

One of the more symbolic but impactful steps NATO could take is to establish a regional office in Tokyo (or perhaps Seoul). French President Emmanuel Macron, who initially blocked the opening of a NATO office in Japan, should now seize the momentum before a new administration with potentially anti-American sentiment takes power in Paris. Allowing the office to open would not only facilitate closer coordination and engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, but also signal NATO’s long-term commitment to the region—and cement France’s leadership role within NATO.

South Korea already has a dedicated representative attached to NATO, albeit from its embassy in Belgium rather than within the NATO building. Formalizing NATO’s presence in the region with a dedicated NATO office in Tokyo (or Seoul) would improve operational efficiency and strategic alignment. It would also provide a physical space for regular interactions, joint planning, and crisis management exercises, institutionalizing the partnership.

The broader implications

Expanding NATO’s cooperation with the IP4, particularly South Korea, is not just about keeping China at bay. The implications of European security challenges, such as the war in Ukraine, extend to the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea’s cooperation with Russia poses direct threats. The newfound friendship between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin illustrates the interconnectedness of these regional threats and the need for a coordinated response.

Europe has always been within range of North Korean ballistic missiles, and the United States could always invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty if it had been attacked by North Korea. In the past, these were more or less theoretical options. Now, the situation with North Korea is more urgent because of its alleged supply of munitions to Russia and possibly other support, including sending men to help Russia in its war in Ukraine. This new reality underscores the urgent need for closer cooperation between NATO and South Korea to effectively address these evolving threats.

As NATO concludes its 75th anniversary summit, the strategic importance of deepening ties with the IP4, and South Korea in particular, cannot be overstated. This cooperation is crucial to addressing the multifaceted threats posed by hybrid warfare, cybersecurity challenges, and geopolitical instability. NATO’s like-minded alliances – between the Alliance and its partners – are the cornerstone of maintaining a rules-based international order. By strengthening these partnerships, NATO can increase its strategic reach and resilience, and ensure a stable and secure global environment.

The evolving relationship between NATO and South Korea is an example of this approach, demonstrating how like-minded cooperation can promote global security and stability in the face of common threats.